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Article 6

Placing a Moratorium on Research
Cloning
to Ensure Effective Control over
Reproductive Cloning
transcribedremarks of
ALEXANDER MORGAN CAPRON*

My thesis is that we need an international moratorium on human
cloning, that is, on any production of human embryos through
somatic cell nuclear transfer ("SCNT") at this time, because this is the
only way to achieve a prohibition of reproductive cloning, for several
reasons. Practically, if any laboratory is free to create human
embryos through SCNT, the result will be cloned babies or, at the
very least, serious attempts to create them. Politically, in order to
enact a ban on reproductive cloning at the federal level, it appears
very likely that a moratorium on research cloning will also be needed.
By the end of the moratorium period, means can be developedwhich do not now exist in state or federal law-both to rein in some
of the wilder, entrepreneurial aspects of the "fertility business" in the
United States and to exercise appropriate control over the manner
and circumstances under which cloned human embryos would be
produced for therapeutic purposes.
Not only is a moratorium on the laboratory production of cloned
human embryos needed for prudential reasons, but it can be achieved
without adverse effects on other important interests. Placing a
moratorium for three to seven years on human embryo cloning will
not thwart the development of potential therapies that are commonly
cited as the reason for allowing research cloning. (Indeed, I think it
amounts to a gross misrepresentation for those who favor research
cloning to try to sell it to the public as "therapeutic cloning" and to
suggest that a ban will prevent thousands-or millions-of patients
with serious and even lethal diseases from obtaining rejection-proof
. University Professor, Henry W. Bruce Professor of Equity, Professor
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Co-Director, Pacific Center for Health Policy and Ethics, University of Southern
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transplants.) Furthermore, adopting a moratorium on the creation of
human embryos through somatic cell nuclear transfer will position the
United States to take a leadership role in international cooperative
efforts that are now underway to restrict the misuse of this new
technology. Finally, allowing the uncontrolled creation of cloned
human embryos risks undermining public support for human
embryonic stem cell ("hESC") research-support, which, I believe,
has been grounded on the argument that these cell lines have been
and can be created from frozen embryos left over from infertility
treatment and donated by couples who would otherwise discard them.
The question is therefore not whether to destroy the embryos (that
decision has already been made), but how they will be destroyed.
Should they be washed away or used as a source of stem cells for
important biomedical research? The notion of creating embryos
solely for research, which will necessarily entail their destruction, is
much more controversial and substantial risk therefore attaches to
any program-such as embryo cloning-that involves the creation of
research embryos.
I. A Few Introductory Remarks on Reproductive Cloning
I do not intend to thoroughly analyze the merits of reproductive
cloning, that is, the creation of children through SCNT. Yet, I cannot
totally ignore the topic, as it undergirds the whole notion of
restricting cloning for research purposes, that is, the creation of
human embryos through SCNT, as a source of stem cells or for other
laboratory studies, restricted to the first two weeks of embryonic
development and without implantation into a uterus.
It is widely agreed that reproductive cloning should be
prohibited. That was the position recommended to President Clinton
by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission in June 1997, in the
first major report on the possibility that the SCNT transfer technique,
demonstrated in mammals by the cloning of the sheep Dolly, might
be applied to human beings.' This conclusion rests principally on the
ethical unacceptability of using such a highly experimental technique
with many known and hypothesized (but unresolved) physical risks
with unconsenting human subjects. It also recognizes that many
substantial psychological, social, legal, and ethical objections to using
SCNT for reproduction have yet to be settled. The conclusion that
reproductive cloning should not be permitted has been reached by
virtually every group to examine the subject since 1997, most recently
by a panel of the National Research Council ("NRC") in mid-January
2002. The week before that, the California Advisory Commission on
1. NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS (1997).
2. COMM. ON SCI., ENGINEERING, AND PUB. POL., SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL

July 2002]

MORATORIUM

Human Cloning recommended legislating against reproductive
cloning on even broader grounds, including the psychological and
social harms.3
The reasons for banning reproductive cloning are many,
beginning with the results of cloning research in animals. As of
September 2001, Ian Wilmut (the cloning pioneer who created Dolly
at the Roslin Institute in Scotland) reported that there have been
31,007 sheep, cow, goat, pig, and mouse eggs used in cloning research
worldwide. These have produced 9,391 embryos for implantation, but
out of that process have come only 267 live-born offspring, many of
whom have had crippling and even lethal abnormalities. With results
like these in mammals, I cannot imagine that any reasonable
researcher-or any reasonable person of any sort-would even be
talking about attempting to use any other novel technology on human
beings. Yet, as you know, there are physicians and scientists who
have very publicly proclaimed that they intend, or are now
attempting, to use SCNT to create human babies.
What is particularly worrisome about the physical risks to the
products of cloning-to say nothing of the additional risks to the
women who would have to be manipulated to produce the eggs
needed or who would act as "surrogate mothers," especially since a
number of the animals carrying clones have themselves died in the
process, apparently due to abnormal development of the fetus they
were carrying-is that these risks apparently cannot be fully predicted
or avoided. The epigenetic changes that have been found to occur as
a result of SCNT seem to relate to the fashion in which the DNA in
the nucleus has to be re-programmed back to the embryonic state,4
which differs from what occurs in normal embryogenesis in ways that
are not yet fully understood. For this reason, it would not even be
possible to "screen" embryos for genetic abnormalities, as some of
the malfunctioning genes would not express themselves in the embryo
and there is, as yet, no way to know which defects in "genetic
imprinting" physicians should be looking for. Moreover, the usual
reason for engaging in a risky medical experiment-that it offers the
only hope of saving a life that is otherwise beyond medical rescue-is
absent here, for without the cloning procedure there would be no
"patient" and no one placed in harm's way.
Despite these substantial reasons why reproductive cloning
would be a reckless and indefensible act, simply on physical grounds,
ASPECTS OF HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE CLONING (2002) [hereinafter SCIENTIFIC AND

MEDICAL ASPECTS].
3. REP. OF THE CAL. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUM. CLONING, CLONING
CALIFORNIANS? 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1145 (2002).

4. David Humphreys et al., Epigenetic Instability in ES Cells and Cloned Mice, 293
SCIENCE 95 (2001).
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to say nothing of the other sorts of harms it might cause, there are
those who have not only announced that they are attempting
reproductive cloning, but who proclaim that prohibiting the use of
SCNT for the creation of children would violate their "reproductive
rights." The United States Supreme Court has never decided
whether our protected liberty interests in making decisions about
family life and in using medical means to prevent the birth of children
encompasses unrestricted access to any and all forms of artificial
reproductive technologies; moreover, even if the constitution protects
"reproductive liberty," it is far from obvious that it would cover the
use of techniques to allow asexual replication rather than sexual
reproduction. It is my own judgment that even if SCNT techniques
were proven (through animal research) to pose no greater risk of
physical harm than artificial reproductive technologies and even if
these techniques were the only means for some people (a very small
number under any credible scenario) to produce genetically related
children, a prohibition on reproductive cloning would still pass
constitutional muster! (Moreover, I do not see how any "last hope"
right to use cloning, were it recognized, could be cabined; rather, it
would establish a right of any person who wanted to use SCNT to do
so and to use any other available means of controlling the genetic
makeup of his or her children.) For the purposes of this article,
suffice it to say that the constitutional objections to banning
reproductive cloning are dubious and unproven, whereas support for
such a prohibition has been demonstrated repeatedly in public
opinion polls, in legislative debates in this country, and by enactments
around the world; most remarkably, leaders in medicine and
science-who rarely if ever favor outlawing any technology-have
supported the enactment of legal prohibitions that carry severe
criminal penalties.
H. Holding Back Research Cloning to Prevent Reproductive
Use
The question is thus whether a ban on reproductive cloning
ought-or must, at least for the time being-also extend to research
5. A central reason why we generally respect the rights of couples to make their own
choices about reproduction and rearing their children is that the kinds of interventions
that would be required if the state tried to decide who was or was not likely to produce
good children or to be a good parent would be enormously intrusive. Indeed, Grisivold
invoked "privacy" as the right that protected individual choice about reproduction
because the statute in question intruded not only on the physician's office where a
contraceptive might be prescribed but also upon the marital bedroom where it might be
used. Griswold v. Connecticut, 380 U.S. 947 (1965). In controlling a high tech procedure
like cloning, the state need not invade the sanctity of the home or set off down a slippery
slope of judging the appropriateness of all reproductive choices.

July 2002]

MORATORIUM

cloning. I am not arguing here in favor of any particular piece of
legislation. In particular, I think Sen. Brownback's bill, S. 1899 (the
Senate version of H.R. 2505, passed by the House last July), which
prohibits cloning for any purpose, has several flaws, not the least of
which is that its ban on research cloning does not take the form of a
time-limited moratorium. Rather, I hope to demonstrate that a
moratorium on research cloning is needed both to make the ban on
reproductive cloning effective and simply to achieve the passage of
such a ban at all.
A. The Connections Between Cloning for Research and for Reproduction

To begin, we need to be clear that cloning does not differ
depending on its purpose. The NRC report labels research cloning "a
very different procedure, 6 from human reproductive cloning, but this
is clearly a matter of political advocacy rather than science. For those
who object to restricting research cloning, it would be handy if the
procedure the NRC would have us call "nuclear transplantation to
produce stem cells" was different, but as the NRC's own illustrations
make clear (compare Figure 1 and Figure 2 in the report), the cloning
procedure is identical up to the point where a blastocyst created
through human SCNT is either implanted into a woman's uterus
(reproductive cloning) or used as a source of stem cells (research
cloning).
Since the procedure is the same, creating cloned embryos for
research would greatly increase the risk of reproductive cloning, just
the way the availability of guns greatly increases the risk of homicide.
That homicide is itself the object of criminal prohibitions does not
obviate the need for gun controls; likewise, a prohibition on
reproductive cloning would not end the need to place a ban on
research cloning until greater assurances can reasonably be made that
embryos cloned "for research purposes" will not be stolen or
misappropriated for reproductive uses. This concern is not merely
rhetorical, as the highly entrepreneurial and largely unregulated in
vitro fertilization (IVF) business in the United States has already
been marked by instances of misappropriation of embryos.
The connection between research and reproductive cloning is
especially important if it turns out to be difficult to produce viable
human blastocysts through SCNT. The scientific sophistication to
create such blastocysts may well be beyond the ability of the selfproclaimed cloners. In that case, not only might the results of studies
carried out to create "research embryos" ease the way for those who
have announced their intention to engage in reproductive cloning, but
they could actually provide reproductive cloners with a source of
6. SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL AsPECTS, supra note 2, at ES-5.
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embryos. Such "leaked" embryos could make it possible for such
would-be cloners to overcome their own technical inabilities to
generate the necessary embryos, leaving them with the less
technically demanding task of achieving pregnancies, using standard
measures developed by IVF clinics.
Finally, in addition to the risk of surreptitious misappropriation,
the existence of cloned embryos in laboratories increases the risk that
reproductive cloning will occur for another reason, namely the
constitutional uncertainties surrounding this field that I mentioned
before. While I am not persuaded by the "reproductive liberty"
arguments against a ban on reproductive cloning, there is no question
that the claim to override such a prohibition would be stronger on
behalf of a woman who has had a clone of herself created than on
behalf of a woman who wants to enjoin the enforcement of the statute
so that a lab will be willing to attempt to create such a cloned embryo.
In the former case, the woman could say, "I have a constitutional
right to have my embryo implanted rather than destroyed. When the
cloning procedure was started, I agreed to allow it to be created for
research purposes, but the rule in all research is that the subject can
change her mind at any time and I have changed mine now and want
to attempt to allow this embryo to be born." Most judges, I would
hope, would reject this argument, but there is nothing in the existing
case law that says it might not persuade some courts. In disputes
between a man and a woman over possession and use of frozen
embryos created with their gametes (as, for example, when a divorced
woman wants to attempt pregnancy with some or all of the IVF
embryos created with her ex-husband, who objects to such use),
courts have responded no differently because the embryos exist than
they would if one person were insisting on using gametes from
another (unwilling) person for reproductive purposes.7 But these
rulings clearly rest on the notion that no one should be forced into
parenthood.
In the hypothetical cloning case, the position of the woman
asserting a right to use her cloned embryo is not opposed by another
person (since this is asexual reproduction, there is no other person!).
Rather, her position is closer to that of a couple seeking to obtain
their frozen IVF embryos from a fertility clinic that does not want to
release them; in the only litigated case of this sort I'm aware of, the
couple prevailed. Thus, the disposition of a challenge to a ban on
reproductive cloning brought by a woman with an existing cloned
embryo, legally created in the absence of a ban on research cloning
(with or without the cooperation of the lab where the cloning
7. Nor have the courts regarded the embryos to possess a "right to be born," such
that the party wishing to attempt pregnancy ought necessarily to prevail.
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occurred), would seem to be in doubt and not resolved by existing
cases. The constitutional claim might be sufficient to persuade some
judges to allow the woman to use her embryo to attempt a pregnancy.
Moreover, once a cloned embryo has been implanted, no court would
order an abortion as a means of implementing a statutory prohibition
on reproductive cloning.
B. A Broad Moratorium is Needed to Get Any Restrictions Adopted

Besides the practical reasons for not allowing research cloning,
the political reality is that the only way to get a ban on reproductive
cloning out of the United States Congress is to put a moratorium on
research. On one side stand the right-to-life forces who insist on a
total ban on all cloning, lest the government say, in effect, "It's okay
to make cloned embryos so long as you kill them rather than implant
them." That, of course, is an anathema to them. On the other side
are those who are not only inclined to favor unfettered research, but
who do not want to vote for S. 1899 (or any bill with comparable
sponsorship) because they do not want to hand their political
opponents an apparent victory. This stalemate has prevented
Congress from acting on reproductive cloning for the past five years.
We really do need federal legislation in this field, as national
uniformity is the only effective way to control human cloning efforts;
furthermore, only federal legislation will permit U.S. representatives
to play an effective leadership role in the international efforts to
prevent reproductive cloning.'
Looking at the wide margin (265-162) by which the House passed
H.R. 2505 (which, like S. 1899, was originally sponsored by antiabortion Members), one might be tempted to think that, this time,
deadlock will be avoided because the Senate will also pass a broad
ban. There are several reasons for thinking otherwise. The most
basic is that the Senate is under Democratic control, which means
that a measure restricted to reproductive cloning and sponsored by
right-to-choice Senators (such as S. 1758, introduced by Sen.
Feinstein) is not only more likely to be favored by a majority for
party-line reasons, but also enjoys the parliamentary advantages of
being favored by the Senate leadership. Second, the research
community, having been surprised by the extent of support for H.R.
S. Already more than thirty countries have prohibited cloning, though some only
restrict reproductive cloning. The United Kingdom, which is the best example of such a
policy, is in a very different situation than the U.S. because their Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Authority exercises real control over the fertility business in their country.
They know how many embryos have been created in their labs and the uses made of them,
whereas we have no idea about that. Under a motion made by the delegates of France
and Germany, the United Nations' Sixth Committee is beginning, in March 2002, a yearlong process of developing treaty structures for international control of human cloning.
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2505, has mounted a vigorous lobbying campaign in favor of
"therapeutic cloning." Last summer, researchers were much more
concerned with ensuring that federal support would be available for
hESC research. HHS Secretary, Tommy Thompson, had suspended
the rules adopted by the National Institutes of Health in 2000, under
President Clinton, under which federal research support could be
provided to scientists to use (albeit not to derive) stem cells from
discarded IVF embryos. Scientist and disease-related advocacy
groups that see hESC research as a promising avenue to cures for
conditions such as Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, and diabetes were
recruiting conservative politicians to lobby President Bush to allow
funding of hESC research, even if it meant backing away from his
pledge to right-to-life groups not to allow federal funds to be spent on
destroying embryos.9 For Representatives who wanted to show their
support for stem cell research, while not unduly offending their rightto-life constituents, a vote in favor of H.R. 2505 was particularly
attractive: it allowed them to say, "I oppose any creation of embryos
for research, especially when it involves a technique as unnatural as
cloning," while simultaneously joining researchers in urging the
President to not overturn the Clinton policy on hESC research
support. The same political circumstances do not now exist in the
Senate as on July 31, 2001, when House members cast their lopsided
vote for H.R. 2505, because nine days later the President announced
his compromise (funding for hESC, but only using stem cells from
embryos destroyed before 9 p.m. EDT on August 9, 2001, when he
announced his decision). Today, with the hESC decision behind
them, disease-advocacy and research lobbyists can focus on
protecting freedom to create cloned human embryos for scientific
purposes and Senators have little need to seek political cover on the
hESC issue through taking a restrictive stance on embryo cloning.
The net result is that one cannot predict that the Senate will
favor S. 1899 simply because the margin of victory for H.R. 2505 was
very great and included many pro-choice Members and moderate
Democrats. Rather, inaction on banning reproductive cloning
remains a real possibility, either because the Senate deadlocks and is
unable to pass any bill or because it passes S. 1758 and the HouseSenate conferees are unable to reconcile the differences between
their measures. Therefore, a second advantage to a moratorium on
research cloning is that it is a middle ground on which both sides
ought to be able to agree: it gives pro-life advocates a ban on all
human embryo cloning, albeit one that is time limited, while
reassuring pro-research advocates that the ban is only temporary and
9. See Alexander Morgan Capron, Stem Cells: Ethics, Law and Politics, 20
BIOTECHNOLOGY L. RPT. 678 (2001).
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subject to review in a few years, at which time the need to create
cloned embryos to provide therapeutic benefits to individuals will
either have been substantiated or not. Furthermore, in the meantime,
state and federal officials can take steps-which are needed anywayto implement effective regulatory measures for the fertility business
and the public can be engaged in a broadly based debate over the
pros and cons of human cloning and genetic modification of children
as part of this general examination of state regulation of reproductive
technologies.
While research advocates might fear that a moratorium on all
forms of cloning would become permanent, that does not seem a real
risk, to me, for several reasons. First, a moratorium could include an
automatic review every five or so years, perhaps even one with a
"sunset provision," meaning that the ban would lapse unless reenacted after a specified term. Second, our experience with
governmental decisions about hESC research demonstrates that when
the prospect of real therapeutic benefit is sufficiently great, politicians
find ways to support research even while proclaiming their adherence
to principles that would seem to lead in the opposite direction.
Notwithstanding the label "therapeutic," human embryo cloning is
not yet at this point. Hence, the willingness of legislators to ban the
creation of human cloned embryos for research today is not a good
basis for predicting how they would vote five years from now if
research on animal cloning and with stem cells derived from noncloned embryos demonstrated the need for, and potential value in,
creating cloned embryos for non-reproductive purposes.
Furthermore, the intervening period would not only allow
serious efforts to control the fertility business, but also the working
out of appropriate structures for "therapeutic cloning." Should
specially licensed, secure laboratories be established where cloning
would be conducted without risking "leakage" of cloned embryos to
reproductive facilities? How-and with what safeguards against
exploitation and physical and psychological harm-will eggs
(potentially millions, were each patient with a relevant disease to be
treated with custom-made stem cells from his or her own cloned
embryos) be obtained from women? What additional authority does
the Food and Drug Administration need in order to play a useful
regulatory role? Are Institutional Review Boards the appropriate
mechanism for overseeing therapeutic cloning research and what
standards ought they to apply?"0 These are only a few of the issues
10. Section 4(b) of Senate Bill 1758 amends the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C.
289 et seq.) by adding section 498C, entitled "Ethical Requirements for Nuclear
Transplantation Research," under which human SCNT research "shall be conducted in
accordance with the applicable provisions" of 46 Code of Federal Regulations section 45
(2001), the so-called "Common Rule" governing research with human subjects. This
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that could receive serious examination during a moratorium and
which are not addressed in present bills.
C. A Moratorium Will Not Cripple Research
Thus far, I have argued that, for practical and political reasons,
legislation to ban reproductive cloning should also include a timelimited moratorium on the creation of human embryos through
SCNT. Opponents of such a limitation-most of whom, such as the
members of the NRC panel, apparently favor criminal penalties on
any attempt at producing babies through cloning-suggest that it
would cripple essential research. Their principal argument, and the
one relied upon by disease-advocacy groups, is that it will be essential
to clone human embryos for therapeutic purposes because the stem
cells derived from a cloned embryo would match the patient-somatic
cell donor and hence would avoid the rejection phenomenon that now
limits organ and tissue transplantation. If this claim was persuasive, it
would certainly weigh against enacting a moratorium on the creation
of cloned embryos for non-reproductive uses, but it simply isn't.
As I have already mentioned, it's very misleading to call this
"therapeutic cloning." If the term "therapeutic" was applicable here,
we might as well simply drop the term "research" generally and call
all processes of developing new biomedical technologies "therapies"
from the outset. There is nothing therapeutic about the possible
creation of cloned human embryos as a source of stem cells, and there
won't be for many years. Indeed, the underlying field of hESC
research is itself in its infancy. The term "therapeutic cloning"
represents an attempt to recruit patient advocates to the cause and, it
seems to me, it has been a really unseemly exploitation of their
desperation. Michael West, the head of Advanced Cell Technology,
the principal company that is now pursuing this technology, told a
Senate committee last year that a ban on therapeutic cloning would
cost 3,000 lives a day, so that even if a ban only created a six-month
delay, Congress would in effect be responsible for taking half a
provision raises a number of questions, not the least of which is whether this structuredeveloped for research that is federally funded, or at least is conducted at institutions that
do a lot of federally funded research and that have agreed to apply the same procedures to
their non-federally funded research-will work if applied to research, all of which is
privately funded (because other existing appropriations provisions prevent any federal
funding of research in which a human embryo would be created or destroyed).
Furthermore, the Common Rule generally requires that research subjects consent to
participate (clearly not possible for embryos) and not be exposed to undue risks of harm
(cloned embryos would be destroyed in the process of creating stem cell lines); thus, the
only possibility for such research to be approved at all is for cloned embryos not to be
regarded as research subjects. But, in that case, the Institutional Review Boards charged
under the Common Rule with reviewing research protocols would have little basis for
deciding whether or not to approve one or another proposal for research cloning.
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million lives. In fact, both the need for and the eventual utility of socalled therapeutic cloning are unproven.
A moratorium on research cloning will not prevent progress
towards therapy. First, much research must be carried out using
hESCs (which can be derived from IVF embryos that are being
discarded and are donated for research instead) before there is any
reason to use cloned embryos as a source for stem cells. Scientists
need to learn how to induce hESCs to differentiate reliably into
particular cell types before it will be possible to safely produce cells
and tissues for treatment. They will also have to demonstrate that
these transplanted cells have the ability to produce therapeutic
benefits. Will the cells function normally? Will they avoid the fate of
the originals? Some recent studies suggest, for example, that where
diabetes results from an autoimmune mechanism, the implantation of
new pancreatic cells is not the solution. Instead, the solution may lie
in overcoming the autoimmune response, which will otherwise
produce the same fate for the implanted cells.
Furthermore, it is not clear that cloned embryos would represent
a better source than banks of hESCs for most patients. First, the very
premise that cloned embryos offer a rejection-proof alternative to
hESC lines is itself in doubt. In most cases (except where a woman is
the source of both the egg and the somatic cell used to create a cloned
embryo), the cloned embryo and the patient would have different
mitochondrial DNA (that is, the genes in the cytoplasm of the cell,
outside the nucleus) and this difference has been reported to cause
immune responses in laboratory animals.
Second, research is
underway to determine whether hESC lines can become "universal
donors" or can at least be made less antigenic, so that transplanted
cells would be less likely to provoke immune rejection by the patient.
Third, hESC lines offer a much quicker and more cost-effective
prospect for transplantation than would stem cells from cloned
embryos. Not only would the latter task face logistical difficulties
(Will the SCNT technique become reliable enough to produce
embryos quickly and easily? Where will all the eggs necessary to
treat patients come from?), but the expense of such "custom-made"
therapy is likely to be prohibitive for most patients. Fourth, the use
of adult stem cells (that is, regenerative cells present in various tissues
of an organism after the embryonic stage) could offer a means of
avoiding immune rejection without having to create cloned embryos
and attempting to derive stem cells from them. Research on the
properties of adult stem cells is a very active field today. If such cells
can be manipulated in a fashion comparable to what is being sought
with ESCs, it might be possible to create cells, tissues, or organs for
transplantation by harvesting readily available stem cells from a
patient's fat or bone marrow and then transforming them into the
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desired type (perhaps to replace damaged heart muscle or
deteriorated neurological cells).
Likewise, with further
understanding of the underlying mechanisms, physicians might be
able to coax the stem cells already available in the patient to perform
needed repairs without removing the cells from a patient's body.
Alongside research on human embryonic and adult stem cells,
much research is required with cloned cells from mammals before the
need arises to clone human embryos for research. For example, are
the epigenetic errors that occur in cloned animals such that it would
be foolish to use cells from cloned human embryos for therapeutic
purposes? If a gene that is disrupted because of the SCNT procedure
were important to the healthy functioning of a particular type of cell,
then using a cloned embryo as a source of such cells for
transplantation could be very risky. Having a moratorium on human
cloning would push researchers to carry their research as far as they
could in mammals, including primates, before turning to human
studies. The upshot of all this is that a moratorium encompassing all
human cloning, rather than just implantation of cloned embryos, will
not prevent any therapies from being used because none are in
prospect any time soon, nor is it likely to delay the development of
such therapies."
MI.Conclusion
Plainly, the practical and political problems that I foresee if
Congress does not include a moratorium on research cloning in its
efforts to prohibit reproductive cloning, as well as the lack of
deleterious effects that I believe such a moratorium would have on
research, are matters of prediction, not of proof. There is some riskprincipally, a risk of delay-if the predictions are wrong, especially
about the effects on research. That risk might not be worth taking if
the production of children through cloning is not something to be
concerned about, indeed, not something to be avoided if possible. So,
in the end, we come back to reproductive cloning and to the merits of
efforts to prevent it occurring.
11. The moratorium would prevent other research, such as the creation of cloned
embryos from somatic cells in which genetic mutations are expressed, as a possible means
of developing stem cells that express the mutation, to aid in studying "how inherited and
acquired alterations of genetic components might contribute to disease processes."
SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL ASPECTS, supra note 2, at ES-12. The NRC panel also opined
that cloning embryos would be useful to ensure that stem cell research "covers a more
genetically diverse human population than that represented in the blastocysts stored in
IVF clinics" but did not explain why it would be necessary to create cloned embryos to
achieve this diversity, and concluded, without explanation or support, that "studies of
genetic reprogramming and genetic imprinting will be substantially enhanced" through
SCNT-derived stem cells compared with other hESCs. Id.
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In the early post-Dolly debates about human cloning, some fairly
specious (or, at least to me, unpersuasive) arguments were raised
against it based on clones being genetically identical.12 Were
objections of this sort the only ones, I would be inclined to agree with
my colleague, Michael Shapiro, who wrote last fall: "The main reason
why human cloning is such a horror is that much of the world would
watch them, poke them, tell them how repulsive their origins are, and
generally treat them as an 'it'." If he is right, the problem-which
would not be an objection to cloning, but rather to our reaction to
it-is plainly avoidable. But I don't think that is all there is, even
when (if ever) the physical risks involved are eliminated.
Nonetheless, the other concerns are neither self-evidently
disqualifying of reproductive cloning, nor are they supported by
directly relevant experiential or experimental data; rather, they are
matters to be analyzed, investigated, and debated and about which, in
the end, disagreements are so likely that the decisive question will be
where the burden of proof rests-with those who would prevent use
of SCNT for the creation of human children, or with those who would
employ this radical new means of creating children. Usually the
response in this country is to place the burden on those who would
regulate, but I think in this case, given what a fundamental and
radical shift asexual reproduction represents, one could-as the
Europeans now do routinely in environmental matters-employ the
precautionary principle. This holds that once a certain prima facie
case of significant and irreversible risks has been made out, those who
would go forward bear the burden of negating the risks and the
absence of definitive evidence cuts against the innovation rather than
against its regulation.
So, what are some of the concerns about reproductive cloning?
One issue about asexual reproduction is whether children would be
harmed by having only one parent, in a genetic sense of the term.
Obviously there are many families in which a stepparent raises a
child, or a father raises a child born within the marriage who is known
not to be his own biological offspring, without such circumstances
raising substantial problems. But the relevance of such experience is
12. One respected person at the University of Chicago suggested that clones would be
used as living sources for replacement parts and organs because they would not be fully
human since their lack of genetic uniqueness would keep them from being individuals or
moral agents. Another notion in the early coverage of cloning in the popular media was
that, somehow, it would immediately produce "xerox copies." For example, in the film
Multiplicity, the character(s) played by Michael Keaton emerged from the duplication
process as ever-more aberrant copies of a full-grown man (with most of his memory-if
not his judgment-intact). As Professor McLean suggests in her article, this public
misunderstanding was exacerbated by the fact that when we first met Dolly she was
already a sheep and not a lamb, leaving the sense that cloning was capable of producing
fully adult organisms, rather than baby replicants.
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not entirely clear, because even then there actually are two biological
parents, whether or not they are both currently involved with the
child.
A second issue is whether the relationship between a person who
is the source of a somatic cell nucleus and the one or more persons
who are that person's clones can even be described in ways that make
sense legally, socially, morally, or what have you. Obviously, such
relationships don't fit existing categories and raise questions about
who is a "sibling" (as the phrase "later-born twin" suggests), or who is
a "parent" (the donor of the somatic cell nucleus or his or her own
parents, whose sexual act gave rise to the unique genome represented
in the clones)? Consider the question of whether there ought to be
restrictions on who a clone could wed. My wife and I have nothing
but sons. If we wanted to have a daughter, probably our best method
would be to clone my wife. Now, suppose we did that and then,
tragically, my wife died. Would her clone, who has no biological
relationship to me, be a suitable replacement for my now dead spouse
(assuming the clone were by then old enough to marry)? She would
be the embodiment of the woman I had married, which is exactly the
kind of "replacement" that people who want to use cloning to replace
a dead child are talking about. Should the rules against incest apply?
What if the clone had been raised by someone other than me and my
late wife?
Many of the most contentious issues about reproductive cloning
concern the impetus it gives to the already existing phenomenon of
"designer babies." The notion that children should be "wanted" is an
attractive one, especially compared with the alternative. One of the
arguments for reproductive liberty is to allow people to be better
parents in all sorts of ways, especially by not having children they
don't want. When there is freedom to choose, those who are born are
that much more precious. Some evidence now seems to suggest that,
while artificial reproductive technologies are associated with slightly
elevated physical risks, the children tend to be wanted (and loved) at
least as much as children born through traditional reproduction. Yet,
the line between a wanted child and a made-for-order child is a small
one. The available means for designing children are too new and too
modest to have produced much evidence about what the harm of
being wanted may be-not in a general sense "a wanted child," but
being wanted for specific characteristics and capabilities, be it male or
female, with a known genetic makeup or specifically, with my own
genetic makeup (and, if Dr. Segal's extrapolation is correct, a cloned
child might be more like me than two twins are like one another).
Raising these issues does not mean that one buys into genetic
determinism-quite the contrary! There are good reasons, however,
to think that people who are drawn to cloning are, in many instances,
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trying to get a predetermined result. Indeed, the whole reason for
using cloning rather than a method of sexual reproduction ("assisted"
or otherwise) is to control the child's genome. So, while it is plainly
the case that a genome is of importance only as it functions in a
cellular, organismic, and social environment, people can be excused
for thinking otherwise, given the prominent attention that science and
the media pay to mapping the genome and to discovering "the gene
for" this and that. Given the uniqueness of each individual's
environmental experience, from the earliest embryonic moment
onvards, it's true that if Mozart were cloned, you wouldn't get
another Mozart. But, so long as the impulse to act otherwise exists,
the failure of the Mozart clones to measure up to expectations is
likely to be a source of harm rather than benefit for them, as their
makers' expectations-and elaborate plans or fantasies-are
disappointed. Of course, it is not uncommon for parents to have
hopes and expectations for their children. But when these fly in the
face of the reality of the child, there are also social forces that rein
in-indeed, that at some point ridicule-parents who try too hard to
mold their children's lives. Were medicine to sanction cloning as a
legitimate way of getting the child you want, it would exacerbate
rather than reduce the drive to regard children as objects to fulfill
parental wants rather than as individuals who are entitled to their
own, self-directed lives. Nor is this a matter of determining the outer
limits of some "right" of paternal manipulation. As Peggy Radin
pointed out years ago, any process that commodifies children has
effects on people who don't even use the technology and I think that
is something which will prove true here as well. To the extent that
procreation becomes manufacture, the choice to go on with
unmediated "sexual roulette"-free of whatever benefits genetic
tinkering or outright cloning might provide-is likely to seem
increasingly irresponsible and perhaps even impermissible.
There are a wealth of other issues that deserve to be examined
and remarkably little data to use in the process. It is frequently
suggested-as it was by Professor Segal in this symposium-that we
can rely on studies of twins, which are read to be largely reassuring
about the results of cloning. This seems largely specious because we
have no studies of twins who are separated in time, especially where
one is an adult at the time the other is born. This difference is crucial
regarding concerns over the domination of a clone by the other, the
extent to which the younger one (when aware of the life of the older
progenitor, even if not raised by that person) would lack the sense of
an "open future" and would instead feel bound to a path laid out in
the life of the other. To the extent the twin studies teach us anything,
they sound a cautionary note. Professor Segal reported that twins
who are more physically alike appear behaviorally to be more
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different because their parents place a bigger emphasis on treating
them differently and because they try harder to differentiate
themselves. With twins, we have two people who (in principle) begin
on a footing of equality; one will have been born shortly before the
other (which I gather is frequently an issue in the relationship), but
they are basically equal. That is not true in cloning of temporally
separated clones and the issue that arises is, obviously, why would
someone be using cloning except to be getting a particular result, so
that rather than wanting to differentiate from the identical twin,
people in this circumstance would be using cloning precisely because
they wanted to get a particular result and would exert pressure
toward that result.
There are many other concerns about the potential effects of
cloning that a moratorium would give us an opportunity to evaluate,
at least to some extent, even if in the end we may have to base
decisions on very incomplete data. Above all, I hope that society as a
whole will be mindful of the enormous power of cloning and genetic
modification of reproduction and of the dangers that inhere in our
inevitable temptation by such power. Often, great hopes have
attached to technological developments, but the experience of recent
years should have taught us that we need caution too. Thinking of
the great power represented by the prospect of human cloning, I am
reminded of C.S. Lewis' remark three decades ago in The Abolition
of Man, that "Each new power won by man is a power over man as
well."13 Cloning provides the ultimate example of his warning: the
power of one generation to determine the makeup of the next.

13. C.S. Lewis, THE ABOLITION OF MAN (1965).

